Book Eleven: 1812 - Chapter II

by Leo Tolstoy

　　The forces of a dozen European nations burst into Russia. TheRussian army and people avoided a collision till Smolensk was reached,and again from Smolensk to Borodino. The French army pushed on toMoscow, its goal, its impetus ever increasing as it neared its aim,just as the velocity of a falling body increases as it approachesthe earth. Behind it were seven hundred miles of hunger-stricken,hostile country; ahead were a few dozen miles separating it from itsgoal. Every soldier in Napoleon's army felt this and the invasionmoved on by its own momentum.

　　The more the Russian army retreated the more fiercely a spirit ofhatred of the enemy flared up, and while it retreated the armyincreased and consolidated. At Borodino a collision took place.Neither army was broken up, but the Russian army retreated immediatelyafter the collision as inevitably as a ball recoils after collidingwith another having a greater momentum, and with equal inevitabilitythe ball of invasion that had advanced with such momentum rolled onfor some distance, though the collision had deprived it of all itsforce.

　　The Russians retreated eighty miles- to beyond Moscow- and theFrench reached Moscow and there came to a standstill. For five weeksafter that there was not a single battle. The French did not move.As a bleeding, mortally wounded animal licks its wounds, they remainedinert in Moscow for five weeks, and then suddenly, with no freshreason, fled back: they made a dash for the Kaluga road, and (aftera victory- for at Malo-Yaroslavets the field of conflict againremained theirs) without undertaking a single serious battle, theyfled still more rapidly back to Smolensk, beyond Smolensk, beyondthe Berezina, beyond Vilna, and farther still.

　　On the evening of the twenty-sixth of August, Kutuzov and thewhole Russian army were convinced that the battle of Borodino was avictory. Kutuzov reported so to the Emperor. He gave orders to preparefor a fresh conflict to finish the enemy and did this not to deceiveanyone, but because he knew that the enemy was beaten, as everyone whohad taken part in the battle knew it.

　　But all that evening and next day reports came in one afteranother of unheard-of losses, of the loss of half the army, and afresh battle proved physically impossible.

　　It was impossible to give battle before information had beencollected, the wounded gathered in, the supplies of ammunitionreplenished, the slain reckoned up, new officers appointed toreplace those who had been killed, and before the men had had food andsleep. And meanwhile, the very next morning after the battle, theFrench army advanced of itself upon the Russians, carried forward bythe force of its own momentum now seemingly increased in inverseproportion to the square of the distance from its aim. Kutuzov'swish was to attack next day, and the whole army desired to do so.But to make an attack the wish to do so is not sufficient, theremust also be a possibility of doing it, and that possibility did notexist. It was impossible not to retreat a day's march, and then in thesame way it was impossible not to retreat another and a third day'smarch, and at last, on the first of September when the army drewnear Moscow- despite the strength of the feeling that had arisen inall ranks- the force of circumstances compelled it to retire beyondMoscow. And the troops retired one more, last, day's march, andabandoned Moscow to the enemy.

　　For people accustomed to think that plans of campaign and battlesare made by generals- as any one of us sitting over a map in his studymay imagine how he would have arranged things in this or thatbattle- the questions present themselves: Why did Kutuzov during theretreat not do this or that? Why did he not take up a positionbefore reaching Fili? Why did he not retire at once by the Kalugaroad, abandoning Moscow? and so on. People accustomed to think in thatway forget, or do not know, the inevitable conditions which alwayslimit the activities of any commander in chief. The activity of acommander in chief does not all resemble the activity we imagine toourselves when we sit at case in our studies examining some campaignon the map, with a certain number of troops on this and that side in acertain known locality, and begin our plans from some given moment.A commander in chief is never dealing with the beginning of any event-the position from which we always contemplate it. The commander inchief is always in the midst of a series of shifting events and sohe never can at any moment consider the whole import of an eventthat is occurring. Moment by moment the event is imperceptibly shapingitself, and at every moment of this continuous, uninterruptedshaping of events the commander in chief is in the midst of a mostcomplex play of intrigues, worries, contingencies, authorities,projects, counsels, threats, and deceptions and is continually obligedto reply to innumerable questions addressed to him, which constantlyconflict with one another.

　　Learned military authorities quite seriously tell us that Kutuzovshould have moved his army to the Kaluga road long before reachingFili, and that somebody actually submitted such a proposal to him. Buta commander in chief, especially at a difficult moment, has alwaysbefore him not one proposal but dozens simultaneously. And all theseproposals, based on strategics and tactics, contradict each other.

　　A commander in chief's business, it would seem, is simply tochoose one of these projects. But even that he cannot do. Events andtime do not wait. For instance, on the twenty-eighth it is suggestedto him to cross to the Kaluga road, but just then an adjutantgallops up from Miloradovich asking whether he is to engage the Frenchor retire. An order must be given him at once, that instant. And theorder to retreat carries us past the turn to the Kaluga road. Andafter the adjutant comes the commissary general asking where thestores are to be taken, and the chief of the hospitals asks wherethe wounded are to go, and a courier from Petersburg brings a letterfrom the sovereign which does not admit of the possibility ofabandoning Moscow, and the commander in chief's rival, the man whois undermining him (and there are always not merely one but severalsuch), presents a new project diametrically opposed to that of turningto the Kaluga road, and the commander in chief himself needs sleep andrefreshment to maintain his energy and a respectable general who hasbeen overlooked in the distribution of rewards comes to complain,and the inhabitants of the district pray to be defended, and anofficer sent to inspect the locality comes in and gives a report quitecontrary to what was said by the officer previously sent; and a spy, aprisoner, and a general who has been on reconnaissance, all describethe position of the enemy's army differently. People accustomed tomisunderstand or to forget these inevitable conditions of acommander in chief's actions describe to us, for instance, theposition of the army at Fili and assume that the commander in chiefcould, on the first of September, quite freely decide whether toabandon Moscow or defend it; whereas, with the Russian army lessthan four miles from Moscow, no such question existed. When had thatquestion been settled? At Drissa and at Smolensk and most palpablyof all on the twenty-fourth of August at Shevardino and on thetwenty-sixth at Borodino, and each day and hour and minute of theretreat from Borodino to Fili.