Book Ten: 1812 - Chapter I

by Leo Tolstoy

　　Napoleon began the war with Russia because he could not resist goingto Dresden, could not help having his head turned by the homage hereceived, could not help donning a Polish uniform and yielding tothe stimulating influence of a June morning, and could not refrainfrom bursts of anger in the presence of Kurakin and then of Balashev.

　　Alexander refused negotiations because he felt himself to bepersonally insulted. Barclay de Tolly tried to command the army in thebest way, because he wished to fulfill his duty and earn fame as agreat commander. Rostov charged the French because he could notrestrain his wish for a gallop across a level field; and in the sameway the innumerable people who took part in the war acted in accordwith their personal characteristics, habits, circumstances, andaims. They were moved by fear or vanity, rejoiced or were indignant,reasoned, imagining that they knew what they were doing and did itof their own free will, but they all were involuntary tools ofhistory, carrying on a work concealed from them but comprehensibleto us. Such is the inevitable fate of men of action, and the higherthey stand in the social hierarchy the less are they free.

　　The actors of 1812 have long since left the stage, their personalinterests have vanished leaving no trace, and nothing remains ofthat time but its historic results.

　　Providence compelled all these men, striving to attain personalaims, to further the accomplishment of a stupendous result no one ofthem at all expected- neither Napoleon, nor Alexander, nor stillless any of those who did the actual fighting.

　　The cause of the destruction of the French army in 1812 is clearto us now. No one will deny that that cause was, on the one hand,its advance into the heart of Russia late in the season without anypreparation for a winter campaign and, on the other, the charactergiven to the war by the burning of Russian towns and the hatred of thefoe this aroused among the Russian people. But no one at the timeforesaw (what now seems so evident) that this was the only way an armyof eight hundred thousand men- the best in the world and led by thebest general- could be destroyed in conflict with a raw army of halfits numerical strength, and led by inexperienced commanders as theRussian army was. Not only did no one see this, but on the Russianside every effort was made to hinder the only thing that could saveRussia, while on the French side, despite Napoleon's experience andso-called military genius, every effort was directed to pushing onto Moscow at the end of the summer, that is, to doing the very thingthat was bound to lead to destruction.

　　In historical works on the year 1812 French writers are very fond ofsaying that Napoleon felt the danger of extending his line, that hesought a battle and that his marshals advised him to stop at Smolensk,and of making similar statements to show that the danger of thecampaign was even then understood. Russian authors are still fonder oftelling us that from the commencement of the campaign a Scythian warplan was adopted to lure Napoleon into the depths of Russia, andthis plan some of them attribute to Pfuel, others to a certainFrenchman, others to Toll, and others again to Alexander himself-pointing to notes, projects, and letters which contain hints of such aline of action. But all these hints at what happened, both from theFrench side and the Russian, are advanced only because they fit inwith the event. Had that event not occurred these hints would havebeen forgotten, as we have forgotten the thousands and millions ofhints and expectations to the contrary which were current then buthave now been forgotten because the event falsified them. There arealways so many conjectures as to the issue of any event that howeverit may end there will always be people to say: "I said then that itwould be so," quite forgetting that amid their innumerable conjecturesmany were to quite the contrary effect.

　　Conjectures as to Napoleon's awareness of the danger of extendinghis line, and (on the Russian side) as to luring the enemy into thedepths of Russia, are evidently of that kind, and only by muchstraining can historians attribute such conceptions to Napoleon andhis marshals, or such plans to the Russian commanders. All the factsare in flat contradiction to such conjectures. During the whole periodof the war not only was there no wish on the Russian side to drawthe French into the heart of the country, but from their first entryinto Russia everything was done to stop them. And not only wasNapoleon not afraid to extend his line, but he welcomed every stepforward as a triumph and did not seek battle as eagerly as in formercampaigns, but very lazily.

　　At the very beginning of the war our armies were divided, and oursole aim was to unite them, though uniting the armies was no advantageif we meant to retire and lure the enemy into the depths of thecountry. Our Emperor joined the army to encourage it to defend everyinch of Russian soil and not to retreat. The enormous Drissa campwas formed on Pfuel's plan, and there was no intention of retiringfarther. The Emperor reproached the commanders in chief for every stepthey retired. He could not bear the idea of letting the enemy evenreach Smolensk, still less could he contemplate the burning of Moscow,and when our armies did unite he was displeased that Smolensk wasabandoned and burned without a general engagement having been foughtunder its walls.

　　So thought the Emperor, and the Russian commanders and people werestill more provoked at the thought that our forces were retreatinginto the depths of the country.

　　Napoleon having cut our armies apart advanced far into the countryand missed several chances of forcing an engagement. In August hewas at Smolensk and thought only of how to advance farther, thoughas we now see that advance was evidently ruinous to him.

　　The facts clearly show that Napoleon did not foresee the danger ofthe advance on Moscow, nor did Alexander and the Russian commandersthen think of luring Napoleon on, but quite the contrary. The luringof Napoleon into the depths of the country was not the result of anyplan, for no one believed it to be possible; it resulted from a mostcomplex interplay of intrigues, aims, and wishes among those whotook part in the war and had no perception whatever of the inevitable,or of the one way of saving Russia. Everything came aboutfortuitously. The armies were divided at the commencement of thecampaign. We tried to unite them, with the evident intention of givingbattle and checking the enemy's advance, and by this effort to unitethem while avoiding battle with a much stronger enemy, and necessarilywithdrawing the armies at an acute angle- we led the French on toSmolensk. But we withdrew at an acute angle not only because theFrench advanced between our two armies; the angle became still moreacute and we withdrew still farther, because Barclay de Tolly was anunpopular foreigner disliked by Bagration (who would come hiscommand), and Bagration- being in command of the second army- tried topostpone joining up and coming under Barclay's command as long as hecould. Bagration was slow in effecting the junction- though that wasthe chief aim of all at headquarters- because, as he alleged, heexposed his army to danger on this march, and it was best for him toretire more to the left and more to the south, worrying the enemy fromflank and rear and securing from the Ukraine recruits for his army;and it looks as if he planned this in order not to come under thecommand of the detested foreigner Barclay, whose rank was inferiorto his own.

　　The Emperor was with the army to encourage it, but his presenceand ignorance of what steps to take, and the enormous number ofadvisers and plans, destroyed the first army's energy and it retired.

　　The intention was to make a stand at the Drissa camp, butPaulucci, aiming at becoming commander in chief, unexpectedly employedhis energy to influence Alexander, and Pfuel's whole plan wasabandoned and the command entrusted to Barclay. But as Barclay did notinspire confidence his power was limited. The armies were divided,there was no unity of command, and Barclay was unpopular; but fromthis confusion, division, and the unpopularity of the foreigncommander in chief, there resulted on the one hand indecision andthe avoidance of a battle (which we could not have refrained fromhad the armies been united and had someone else, instead of Barclay,been in command) and on the other an ever-increasing indignationagainst the foreigners and an increase in patriotic zeal.

　　At last the Emperor left the army, and as the most convenient andindeed the only pretext for his departure it was decided that it wasnecessary for him to inspire the people in the capitals and arouse thenation in general to a patriotic war. And by this visit of the Emperorto Moscow the strength of the Russian army was trebled.

　　He left in order not to obstruct the commander in chief'sundivided control of the army, and hoping that more decisive actionwould then be taken, but the command of the armies became still moreconfused and enfeebled. Bennigsen, the Tsarevich, and a swarm ofadjutants general remained with the army to keep the commander inchief under observation and arouse his energy, and Barclay, feelingless free than ever under the observation of all these "eyes of theEmperor," became still more cautious of undertaking any decisiveaction and avoided giving battle.

　　Barclay stood for caution. The Tsarevich hinted at treachery anddemanded a general engagement. Lubomirski, Bronnitski, Wlocki, and theothers of that group stirred up so much trouble that Barclay, underpretext of sending papers to the Emperor, dispatched these Polishadjutants general to Petersburg and plunged into an open struggle withBennigsen and the Tsarevich.

　　At Smolensk the armies at last reunited, much as Bagrationdisliked it.

　　Bagration drove up in a carriage to to the house occupied byBarclay. Barclay donned his sash and came out to meet and report tohis senior officer Bagration.

　　Despite his seniority in rank Bagration, in this contest ofmagnanimity, took his orders from Barclay, but, having submitted,agreed with him less than ever. By the Emperor's orders Bagrationreported direct to him. He wrote to Arakcheev, the Emperor'sconfidant: "It must be as my sovereign pleases, but I cannot work withthe Minister (meaning Barclay). For God's sake send me somewhereelse if only in command of a regiment. I cannot stand it here.Headquarters are so full of Germans that a Russian cannot exist andthere is no sense in anything. I thought I was really serving mysovereign and the Fatherland, but it turns out that I am servingBarclay. I confess I do not want to."

　　The swarm of Bronnitskis and Wintzingerodes and their like stillfurther embittered the relations between the commanders in chief,and even less unity resulted. Preparations were made to fight theFrench before Smolensk. A general was sent to survey the position.This general, hating Barclay, rode to visit a friend of his own, acorps commander, and, having spent the day with him, returned toBarclay and condemned, as unsuitable from every point of view, thebattleground he had not seen.

　　While disputes and intrigues were going on about the future field ofbattle, and while we were looking for the French- having lost touchwith them- the French stumbled upon Neverovski's division andreached the walls of Smolensk.

　　It was necessary to fight an unexpected battle at Smolensk to saveour lines of communication. The battle was fought and thousands werekilled on both sides.

　　Smolensk was abandoned contrary to the wishes of the Emperor andof the whole people. But Smolensk was burned by its owninhabitants-who had been misled by their governor. And these ruinedinhabitants, setting an example to other Russians, went to Moscowthinking only of their own losses but kindling hatred of the foe.Napoleon advanced farther and we retired, thus arriving at the veryresult which caused his destruction.