Book Ten: 1812 - Chapter XXVII

by Leo Tolstoy

　　On the twenty-fifth of August, so his historians tell us, Napoleonspent the whole day on horseback inspecting the locality,considering plans submitted to him by his marshals, and personallygiving commands to his generals.

　　The original line of the Russian forces along the river Kolochahad been dislocated by the capture of the Shevardino Redoubt on thetwenty-fourth, and part of the line- the left flank- had been drawnback. That part of the line was not entrenched and in front of itthe ground was more open and level than elsewhere. It was evident toanyone, military or not, that it was here the French should attack. Itwould seem that not much consideration was needed to reach thisconclusion, nor any particular care or trouble on the part of theEmperor and his marshals, nor was there any need of that special andsupreme quality called genius that people are so apt to ascribe toNapoleon; yet the historians who described the event later and the menwho then surrounded Napoleon, and he himself, thought otherwise.

　　Napoleon rode over the plain and surveyed the locality with aprofound air and in silence, nodded with approval or shook his headdubiously, and without communicating to the generals around him theprofound course of ideas which guided his decisions merely gave themhis final conclusions in the form of commands. Having listened to asuggestion from Davout, who was now called Prince d'Eckmuhl, to turnthe Russian left wing, Napoleon said it should not be done, withoutexplaining why not. To a proposal made by General Campan (who was toattack the fleches) to lead his division through the woods, Napoleonagreed, though the so-called Duke of Elchingen (Ney) ventured toremark that a movement through the woods was dangerous and mightdisorder the division.

　　Having inspected the country opposite the Shevardino Redoubt,Napoleon pondered a little in silence and then indicated the spotswhere two batteries should be set up by the morrow to act againstthe Russian entrenchments, and the places where, in line with them,the field artillery should be placed.

　　After giving these and other commands he returned to his tent, andthe dispositions for the battle were written down from his dictation.

　　These dispositions, of which the French historians write withenthusiasm and other historians with profound respect, were asfollows:

　　At dawn the two new batteries established during the night on theplain occupied by the Prince d'Eckmuhl will open fire on theopposing batteries of the enemy.

　　At the same time the commander of the artillery of the 1st Corps,General Pernetti, with thirty cannon of Campan's division and allthe howitzers of Dessaix's and Friant's divisions, will moveforward, open fire, and overwhelm with shellfire the enemy'sbattery, against which will operate:

　　24 guns of the artillery of the Guards 30 guns of Campan's division

　　and 8 guns of Friant's and Dessaix's divisions -- in all 62 guns.The commander of the artillery of the 3rd Corps, General Fouche,will place the howitzers of the 3rd and 8th Corps, sixteen in all,on the flanks of the battery that is to bombard the entrenchment onthe left, which will have forty guns in all directed against it.

　　General Sorbier must be ready at the first order to advance with allthe howitzers of the Guard's artillery against either one or otherof the entrenchments.

　　During the cannonade Prince Poniatowski is to advance through thewood on the village and turn the enemy's position.

　　General Campan will move through the wood to seize the firstfortification.

　　After the advance has begun in this manner, orders will be givenin accordance with the enemy's movements.

　　The cannonade on the left flank will begin as soon as the guns ofthe right wing are heard. The sharpshooters of Morand's division andof the vice-King's division will open a heavy fire on seeing theattack commence on the right wing.

　　The vice-King will occupy the village and cross by its threebridges, advancing to the same heights as Morand's and Gibrard'sdivisions, which under his leadership will be directed against theredoubt and come into line with the rest of the forces.

　　All this must be done in good order (le tout se fera avec ordre etmethode) as far as possible retaining troops in reserve.The Imperial Camp near Mozhaysk,September, 6, 1812.

　　These dispositions, which are very obscure and confused if oneallows oneself to regard the arrangements without religious awe of hisgenius, related to Napoleon's orders to deal with four points- fourdifferent orders. Not one of these was, or could be, carried out.

　　In the disposition it is said first that the batteries placed on thespot chosen by Napoleon, with the guns of Pernetti and Fouche; whichwere to come in line with them, 102 guns in all, were to open fire andshower shells on the Russian fleches and redoubts. This could not bedone, as from the spots selected by Napoleon the projectiles did notcarry to the Russian works, and those 102 guns shot into the air untilthe nearest commander, contrary to Napoleon's instructions, moved themforward.

　　The second order was that Poniatowski, moving to the village throughthe wood, should turn the Russian left flank. This could not be doneand was not done, because Poniatowski, advancing on the villagethrough the wood, met Tuchkov there barring his way, and could not anddid not turn the Russian position.

　　The third order was: General Campan will move through the wood toseize the first fortification. General Campan's division did not seizethe first fortification but was driven back, for on emerging fromthe wood it had to reform under grapeshot, of which Napoleon wasunaware.

　　The fourth order was: The vice-King will occupy the village(Borodino) and cross by its three bridges, advancing to the sameheights as Morand's and Gdrard's divisions (for whose movements nodirections are given), which under his leadership will be directedagainst the redoubt and come into line with the rest of the forces.

　　As far as one can make out, not so much from this unintelligiblesentence as from the attempts the vice-King made to execute the ordersgiven him, he was to advance from the left through Borodino to theredoubt while the divisions of Morand and Gerard were to advancesimultaneously from the front.

　　All this, like the other parts of the disposition, was not and couldnot be executed. After passing through Borodino the vice-King wasdriven back to the Kolocha and could get no farther; while thedivisions of Morand and Gerard did not take the redoubt but weredriven back, and the redoubt was only taken at the end of the battleby the cavalry (a thing probably unforeseen and not heard of byNapoleon). So not one of the orders in the disposition was, or couldbe, executed. But in the disposition it is said that, after thefight has commenced in this manner, orders will be given in accordancewith the enemy's movements, and so it might be supposed that allnecessary arrangements would be made by Napoleon during the battle.But this was not and could not be done, for during the whole battleNapoleon was so far away that, as appeared later, he could not knowthe course of the battle and not one of his orders during the fightcould be executed.