Book Thirteen: 1812 - Chapter III

by Leo Tolstoy

　　The Russian army was commanded by Kutuzov and his staff, and also bythe Emperor from Petersburg. Before the news of the abandonment ofMoscow had been received in Petersburg, a detailed plan of the wholecampaign had been drawn up and sent to Kutuzov for his guidance.Though this plan had been drawn up on the supposition that Moscowwas still in our hands, it was approved by the staff and accepted as abasis for action. Kutuzov only replied that movements arranged froma distance were always difficult to execute. So fresh instructionswere sent for the solution of difficulties that might beencountered, as well as fresh people who were to watch Kutuzov'sactions and report upon them.

　　Besides this, the whole staff of the Russian army was nowreorganized. The posts left vacant by Bagration, who had beenkilled, and by Barclay, who had gone away in dudgeon, had to befilled. Very serious consideration was given to the question whetherit would be better to put A in B's place and B in D's, or on thecontrary to put D in A's place, and so on- as if anything more thanA's or B's satisfaction depended on this.

　　As a result of the hostility between Kutuzov and Bennigsen, hisChief of Staff, the presence of confidential representatives of theEmperor, and these transfers, a more than usually complicated playof parties was going on among the staff of the army. A was underminingB, D was undermining C, and so on in all possible combinations andpermutations. In all these plottings the subject of intrigue wasgenerally the conduct of the war, which all these men believed theywere directing; but this affair of the war went on independently ofthem, as it had to go: that is, never in the way people devised, butflowing always from the essential attitude of the masses. Only inthe highest spheres did all these schemes, crossings, andinterminglings appear to be a true reflection of what had to happen.

　　Prince Michael Ilarionovich! (wrote the Emperor on the second ofOctober in a letter that reached Kutuzov after the battle at Tarutino)Since September 2 Moscow has been in the hands of the enemy. Your lastreports were written on the twentieth, and during all this time notonly has no action been taken against the enemy or for the relief ofthe ancient capital, but according to your last report you have evenretreated farther. Serpukhov is already occupied by an enemydetachment and Tula with its famous arsenal so indispensable to thearmy, is in danger. From General Wintzingerode's reports, I see thatan enemy corps of ten thousand men is moving on the Petersburg road.Another corps of several thousand men is moving on Dmitrov. A thirdhas advanced along the Vladimir road, and a fourth, ratherconsiderable detachment is stationed between Ruza and Mozhaysk.Napoleon himself was in Moscow as late as the twenty-fifth. In view ofall this information, when the enemy has scattered his forces in largedetachments, and with Napoleon and his Guards in Moscow, is itpossible that the enemy's forces confronting you are so considerableas not to allow of your taking the offensive? On the contrary, he isprobably pursuing you with detachments, or at most with an armycorps much weaker than the army entrusted to you. It would seemthat, availing yourself of these circumstances, you mightadvantageously attack a weaker one and annihilate him, or at leastoblige him to retreat, retaining in our hands an important part of theprovinces now occupied by the enemy, and thereby averting dangerfrom Tula and other towns in the interior. You will be responsibleif the enemy is able to direct a force of any size againstPetersburg to threaten this capital in which it has not beenpossible to retain many troops; for with the army entrusted to you,and acting with resolution and energy, you have ample means to avertthis fresh calamity. Remember that you have still to answer to ouroffended country for the loss of Moscow. You have experienced myreadiness to reward you. That readiness will not weaken in me, but Iand Russia have a right to expect from you all the zeal, firmness, andsuccess which your intellect, military talent, and the courage ofthe troops you command justify us in expecting.

　　But by the time this letter, which proved that the real relationof the forces had already made itself felt in Petersburg, wasdispatched, Kutuzov had found himself unable any longer to restrainthe army he commanded from attacking and a battle had taken place.

　　On the second of October a Cossack, Shapovalov, who was outscouting, killed one hare and wounded another. Following the woundedhare he made his way far into the forest and came upon the leftflank of Murat's army, encamped there without any precautions. TheCossack laughingly told his comrades how he had almost fallen into thehands of the French. A cornet, hearing the story, informed hiscommander.

　　The Cossack was sent for and questioned. The Cossack officers wishedto take advantage of this chance to capture some horses, but one ofthe superior officers, who was acquainted with the higher authorities,reported the incident to a general on the staff. The state ofthings on the staff had of late been exceedingly strained. Ermolov hadbeen to see Bennigsen a few days previously and had entreated him touse his influence with the commander in chief to induce him to takethe offensive.

　　"If I did not know you I should think you did not want what youare asking for. I need only advise anything and his Highness is sureto do the opposite," replied Bennigsen.

　　The Cossack's report, confirmed by horse patrols who were sentout, was the final proof that events had matured. The tightly coiledspring was released, the clock began to whirr and the chimes toplay. Despite all his supposed power, his intellect, his experience,and his knowledge of men, Kutuzov- having taken into consideration theCossack's report, a note from Bennigsen who sent personal reports tothe Emperor, the wishes he supposed the Emperor to hold, and thefact that all the generals expressed the same wish- could no longercheck the inevitable movement, and gave the order to do what heregarded as useless and harmful- gave his approval, that is, to theaccomplished fact.