Book Thirteen: 1812 - Chapter VIII

by Leo Tolstoy

　　Napoleon enters Moscow after the brilliant victory de la Moskowa;there can be no doubt about the victory for the battlefield remains inthe hands of the French. The Russians retreat and abandon theirancient capital. Moscow, abounding in provisions, arms, munitions, andincalculable wealth, is in Napoleon's hands. The Russian army, onlyhalf the strength of the French, does not make a single attempt toattack for a whole month. Napoleon's position is most brilliant. Hecan either fall on the Russian army with double its strength anddestroy it; negotiate an advantageous peace, or in case of a refusalmake a menacing move on Petersburg, or even, in the case of a reverse,return to Smolensk or Vilna; or remain in Moscow; in short, no specialgenius would seem to be required to retain the brilliant positionthe French held at that time. For that, only very simple and easysteps were necessary: not to allow the troops to loot, to preparewinter clothing- of which there was sufficient in Moscow for the wholearmy- and methodically to collect the provisions, of which(according to the French historians) there were enough in Moscow tosupply the whole army for six months. Yet Napoleon, that greatest ofall geniuses, who the historians declare had control of the army, tooknone of these steps.

　　He not merely did nothing of the kind, but on the contrary he usedhis power to select the most foolish and ruinous of all the coursesopen to him. Of all that Napoleon might have done: wintering inMoscow, advancing on Petersburg or on Nizhni-Novgorod, or retiringby a more northerly or more southerly route (say by the road Kutuzovafterwards took), nothing more stupid or disastrous can be imaginedthan what he actually did. He remained in Moscow till October, lettingthe troops plunder the city; then, hesitating whether to leave agarrison behind him, he quitted Moscow, approached Kutuzov withoutjoining battle, turned to the right and reached Malo-Yaroslavets,again without attempting to break through and take the road Kutuzovtook, but retiring instead to Mozhaysk along the devastated Smolenskroad. Nothing more stupid than that could have been devised, or moredisastrous for the army, as the sequel showed. Had Napoleon's aim beento destroy his army, the most skillful strategist could hardly havedevised any series of actions that would so completely haveaccomplished that purpose, independently of anything the Russianarmy might do.

　　Napoleon, the man of genius, did this! But to say that hedestroyed his army because he wished to, or because he was verystupid, would be as unjust as to say that he had brought his troops toMoscow because he wished to and because he was very clever and agenius.

　　In both cases his personal activity, having no more force than thepersonal activity of any soldier, merely coincided with the lawsthat guided the event.

　　The historians quite falsely represent Napoleon's faculties ashaving weakened in Moscow, and do so only because the results didnot justify his actions. He employed all his ability and strength todo the best he could for himself and his army, as he had donepreviously and as he did subsequently in 1813. His activity at thattime was no less astounding than it was in Egypt, in Italy, inAustria, and in Prussia. We do not know for certain in how far hisgenius was genuine in Egypt- where forty centuries looked down uponhis grandeur- for his great exploits there are all told us byFrenchmen. We cannot accurately estimate his genius in Austria orPrussia, for we have to draw our information from French or Germansources, and the incomprehensible surrender of whole corps withoutfighting and of fortresses without a siege must incline Germans torecognize his genius as the only explanation of the war carried onin Germany. But we, thank God, have no need to recognize his genius inorder to hide our shame. We have paid for the right to look at thematter plainly and simply, and we will not abandon that right.

　　His activity in Moscow was as amazing and as full of genius aselsewhere. Order after order order and plan after plan were issuedby him from the time he entered Moscow till the time he left it. Theabsence of citizens and of a deputation, and even the burning ofMoscow, did not disconcert him. He did not lose sight either of thewelfare of his army or of the doings of the enemy, or of the welfareof the people of Russia, or of the direction of affairs in Paris, orof diplomatic considerations concerning the terms of the anticipatedpeace.