Book Thirteen: 1812 - Chapter XVIII

by Leo Tolstoy

　　From the time he received this news to the end of the campaign allKutuzov's activity was directed toward restraining his troops, byauthority, by guile, and by entreaty, from useless attacks, maneuvers,or encounters with the perishing enemy. Dokhturov went toMalo-Yaroslavets, but Kutuzov lingered with the main army and gaveorders for the evacuation of Kaluga- a retreat beyond which townseemed to him quite possible.

　　Everywhere Kutuzov retreated, but the enemy without waiting forhis retreat fled in the opposite direction.

　　Napoleon's historians describe to us his skilled maneuvers atTarutino and Malo-Yaroslavets, and make conjectures as to what wouldhave happened had Napoleon been in time to penetrate into the richsouthern provinces.

　　But not to speak of the fact that nothing prevented him fromadvancing into those southern provinces (for the Russian army didnot bar his way), the historians forget that nothing could havesaved his army, for then already it bore within itself the germs ofinevitable ruin. How could that army- which had found abundantsupplies in Moscow and had trampled them underfoot instead ofkeeping them, and on arriving at Smolensk had looted provisionsinstead of storing them- how could that army recuperate in Kalugaprovince, which was inhabited by Russians such as those who lived inMoscow, and where fire had the same property of consuming what was setablaze?

　　That army could not recover anywhere. Since the battle of Borodinoand the pillage of Moscow it had borne within itself, as it were,the chemical elements of dissolution.

　　The members of what had once been an army- Napoleon himself andall his soldiers fled- without knowing whither, each concerned only tomake his escape as quickly as possible from this position, of thehopelessness of which they were all more or less vaguely conscious.

　　So it came about that at the council at Malo-Yaroslavets, when thegenerals pretending to confer together expressed various opinions, allmouths were closed by the opinion uttered by the simple-minded soldierMouton who, speaking last, said what they all felt: that the one thingneedful was to get away as quickly as possible; and no one, not evenNapoleon, could say anything against that truth which they allrecognized.

　　But though they all realized that it was necessary to get away,there still remained a feeling of shame at admitting that they mustflee. An external shock was needed to overcome that shame, and thisshock came in due time. It was what the French called "le hourra del'Empereur."

　　The day after the council at Malo-Yaroslavets Napoleon rode outearly in the morning amid the lines of his army with his suite ofmarshals and an escort, on the pretext of inspecting the army andthe scene of the previous and of the impending battle. Some Cossackson the prowl for booty fell in with the Emperor and very nearlycaptured him. If the Cossacks did not capture Napoleon then, whatsaved him was the very thing that was destroying the French army,the booty on which the Cossacks fell. Here as at Tarutino they wentafter plunder, leaving the men. Disregarding Napoleon they rushedafter the plunder and Napoleon managed to escape.

　　When les enfants du Don might so easily have taken the Emperorhimself in the midst of his army, it was clear that there wasnothing for it but to fly as fast as possible along the nearest,familiar road. Napoleon with his forty-year-old stomach understoodthat hint, not feeling his former agility and boldness, and underthe influence of the fright the Cossacks had given him he at onceagreed with Mouton and issued orders- as the historians tell us- toretreat by the Smolensk road.

　　That Napoleon agreed with Mouton, and that the army retreated,does not prove that Napoleon caused it to retreat, but that the forceswhich influenced the whole army and directed it along the Mozhaysk(that is, the Smolensk) road acted simultaneously on him also.