First Epilogue: 1813-20 - Chapter I

by Leo Tolstoy

　　Seven years had passed. The storm-tossed sea of European history hadsubsided within its shores and seemed to have become calm. But themysterious forces that move humanity (mysterious because the laws oftheir motion are unknown to us) continued to operate.

　　Though the surface of the sea of history seemed motionless, themovement of humanity went on as unceasingly as the flow of time.Various groups of people formed and dissolved, the coming formationand dissolution of kingdoms and displacement of peoples was incourse of preparation.

　　The sea of history was not driven spasmodically from shore toshore as previously. It was seething in its depths. Historic figureswere not borne by the waves from one shore to another as before.They now seemed to rotate on one spot. The historical figures at thehead of armies, who formerly reflected the movement of the masses byordering wars, campaigns, and battles, now reflected the restlessmovement by political and diplomatic combinations, laws, and treaties.

　　The historians call this activity of the historical figures "thereaction."

　　In dealing with this period they sternly condemn the historicalpersonages who, in their opinion, caused what they describe as thereaction. All the well-known people of that period, from Alexander andNapoleon to Madame de Stael, Photius, Schelling, Fichte,Chateaubriand, and the rest, pass before their stern judgment seat andare acquitted or condemned according to whether they conduced toprogress or to reaction.

　　According to their accounts a reaction took place at that time inRussia also, and the chief culprit was Alexander I, the same man whoaccording to them was the chief cause of the liberal movement at thecommencement of his reign, being the savior of Russia.

　　There is no one in Russian literature now, from schoolboy essayistto learned historian, who does not throw his little stone at Alexanderfor things he did wrong at this period of his reign.

　　"He ought to have acted in this way and in that way. In this case hedid well and in that case badly. He behaved admirably at the beginningof his reign and during 1812, but acted badly by giving a constitutionto Poland, forming the Holy Alliance, entrusting power to Arakcheev,favoring Golitsyn and mysticism, and afterwards Shishkov andPhotius. He also acted badly by concerning himself with the activearmy and disbanding the Semenov regiment."

　　It would take a dozen pages to enumerate all the reproaches thehistorians address to him, based on their knowledge of what is goodfor humanity.

　　What do these reproaches mean?

　　Do not the very actions for which the historians praise AlexanderI (the liberal attempts at the beginning of his reign, his strugglewith Napoleon, the firmness he displayed in 1812 and the campaign of1813) flow from the same sources- the circumstances of his birth,education, and life- that made his personality what it was and fromwhich the actions for which they blame him (the Holy Alliance, therestoration of Poland, and the reaction of 1820 and later) alsoflowed?

　　In what does the substance of those reproaches lie?

　　It lies in the fact that an historic character like Alexander I,standing on the highest possible pinnacle of human power with theblinding light of history focused upon him; a character exposed tothose strongest of all influences: the intrigues, flattery, andself-deception inseparable from power; a character who at every momentof his life felt a responsibility for all that was happening inEurope; and not a fictitious but a live character who like every manhad his personal habits, passions, and impulses toward goodness,beauty, and truth- that this character- though not lacking in virtue(the historians do not accuse him of that)- had not the sameconception of the welfare of humanity fifty years ago as a present-dayprofessor who from his youth upwards has been occupied withlearning: that is, with books and lectures and with taking notesfrom them.

　　But even if we assume that fifty years ago Alexander I wasmistaken in his view of what was good for the people, we mustinevitably assume that the historian who judges Alexander will alsoafter the lapse of some time turn out to be mistaken in his view ofwhat is good for humanity. This assumption is all the more natural andinevitable because, watching the movement of history, we see thatevery year and with each new writer, opinion as to what is good formankind changes; so that what once seemed good, ten years laterseems bad, and vice versa. And what is more, we find at one and thesame time quite contradictory views as to what is bad and what is goodin history: some people regard giving a constitution to Poland andforming the Holy Alliance as praiseworthy in Alexander, while othersregard it as blameworthy.

　　The activity of Alexander or of Napoleon cannot be called usefulor harmful, for it is impossible to say for what it was useful orharmful. If that activity displeases somebody, this is only because itdoes not agree with his limited understanding of what is good. Whetherthe preservation of my father's house in Moscow, or the glory of theRussian arms, or the prosperity of the Petersburg and otheruniversities, or the freedom of Poland or the greatness of Russia,or the balance of power in Europe, or a certain kind of Europeanculture called "progress" appear to me to be good or bad, I must admitthat besides these things the action of every historic character hasother more general purposes inaccessible to me.

　　But let us assume that what is called science can harmonize allcontradictions and possesses an unchanging standard of good and bad bywhich to try historic characters and events; let us say that Alexandercould have done everything differently; let us say that withguidance from those who blame him and who profess to know the ultimateaim of the movement of humanity, he might have arranged mattersaccording to the program his present accusers would have given him- ofnationality, freedom, equality, and progress (these, I think, coverthe ground). Let us assume that this program was possible and had thenbeen formulated, and that Alexander had acted on it. What would thenhave become of the activity of all those who opposed the tendency thatthen prevailed in the government- an activity that in the opinion ofthe historians was good and beneficent? Their activity would nothave existed: there would have been no life, there would have beennothing.

　　If we admit that human life can be ruled by reason, thepossibility of life is destroyed.