Second Epilogue: 1813-20 - Chapter II

by Leo Tolstoy

　　What force moves the nations?

　　Biographical historians and historians of separate nationsunderstand this force as a power inherent in heroes and rulers. Intheir narration events occur solely by the will of a Napoleon, andAlexander, or in general of the persons they describe. The answersgiven by this kind of historian to the question of what force causesevents to happen are satisfactory only as long as there is but onehistorian to each event. As soon as historians of differentnationalities and tendencies begin to describe the same event, thereplies they give immediately lose all meaning, for this force isunderstood by them all not only differently but often in quitecontradictory ways. One historian says that an event was produced byNapoleon's power, another that it was produced by Alexander's, a thirdthat it was due to the power of some other person. Besides this,historians of that kind contradict each other even in theirstatement as to the force on which the authority of some particularperson was based. Thiers, a Bonapartist, says that Napoleon's powerwas based on his virtue and genius. Lanfrey, a Republican, says it wasbased on his trickery and deception of the people. So the historiansof this class, by mutually destroying one another's positions, destroythe understanding of the force which produces events, and furnish noreply to history's essential question.

　　Writers of universal history who deal with all the nations seem torecognize how erroneous is the specialist historians' view of theforce which produces events. They do not recognize it as a powerinherent in heroes and rulers, but as the resultant of amultiplicity of variously directed forces. In describing a war orthe subjugation of a people, a general historian looks for the causeof the event not in the power of one man, but in the interaction ofmany persons connected with the event.

　　According to this view the power of historical personages,represented as the product of many forces, can no longer, it wouldseem, be regarded as a force that itself produces events. Yet inmost cases universal historians still employ the conception of poweras a force that itself produces events, and treat it as their cause.In their exposition, an historic character is first the product of histime, and his power only the resultant of various forces, and then hispower is itself a force producing events. Gervinus, Schlosser, andothers, for instance, at one time prove Napoleon to be a product ofthe Revolution, of the ideas of 1789 and so forth, and at anotherplainly say that the campaign of 1812 and other things they do notlike were simply the product of Napoleon's misdirected will, andthat the very ideas of 1789 were arrested in their development byNapoleon's caprice. The ideas of the Revolution and the general temperof the age produced Napoleon's power. But Napoleon's powersuppressed the ideas of the Revolution and the general temper of theage.

　　This curious contradiction is not accidental. Not only does it occurat every step, but the universal historians' accounts are all madeup of a chain of such contradictions. This contradiction occursbecause after entering the field of analysis the universalhistorians stop halfway.

　　To find component forces equal to the composite or resultantforce, the sum of the components must equal the resultant. Thiscondition is never observed by the universal historians, and so toexplain the resultant forces they are obliged to admit, in addition tothe insufficient components, another unexplained force affecting theresultant action.

　　Specialist historians describing the campaign of 1813 or therestoration of the Bourbons plainly assert that these events wereproduced by the will of Alexander. But the universal historianGervinus, refuting this opinion of the specialist historian, triesto prove that the campaign of 1813 and the restoration of the Bourbonswere due to other things beside Alexander's will- such as the activityof Stein, Metternich, Madame de Stael, Talleyrand, FichteChateaubriand, and others. The historian evidently decomposesAlexander's power into the components: Talleyrand, Chateaubriand,and the rest- but the sum of the components, that is, the interactionsof Chateaubriand, Talleyrand, Madame de Stael, and the others,evidently does not equal the resultant, namely the phenomenon ofmillions of Frenchmen submitting to the Bourbons. ThatChateaubriand, Madame de Stael, and others spoke certain words toone another only affected their mutual relations but does notaccount for the submission of millions. And therefore to explain howfrom these relations of theirs the submission of millions of peopleresulted- that is, how component forces equal to one A gave aresultant equal to a thousand times A- the historian is againobliged to fall back on power- the force he had denied- and torecognize it as the resultant of the forces, that is, he has toadmit an unexplained force acting on the resultant. And that is justwhat the universal historians do, and consequently they not onlycontradict the specialist historians but contradict themselves.

　　Peasants having no clear idea of the cause of rain, say, accordingto whether they want rain or fine weather: "The wind has blown theclouds away," or, "The wind has brought up the clouds." And in thesame way the universal historians sometimes, when it pleases themand fits in with their theory, say that power is the result of events,and sometimes, when they want to prove something else, say thatpower produces events.

　　A third class of historians- the so-called historians of culture-following the path laid down by the universal historians who sometimesaccept writers and ladies as forces producing events- again takethat force to be something quite different. They see it in what iscalled culture- in mental activity.

　　The historians of culture are quite consistent in regard to theirprogenitors, the writers of universal histories, for if historicalevents may be explained by the fact that certain persons treated oneanother in such and such ways, why not explain them by the fact thatsuch and such people wrote such and such books? Of the immensenumber of indications accompanying every vital phenomenon, thesehistorians select the indication of intellectual activity and say thatthis indication is the cause. But despite their endeavors to provethat the cause of events lies in intellectual activity, only by agreat stretch can one admit that there is any connection betweenintellectual activity and the movement of peoples, and in no casecan one admit that intellectual activity controls people's actions,for that view is not confirmed by such facts as the very cruel murdersof the French Revolution resulting from the doctrine of the equalityof man, or the very cruel wars and executions resulting from thepreaching of love.

　　But even admitting as correct all the cunningly devised argumentswith which these histories are filled- admitting that nations aregoverned by some undefined force called an idea- history's essentialquestion still remains unanswered, and to the former power of monarchsand to the influence of advisers and other people introduced by theuniversal historians, another, newer force- the idea- is added, theconnection of which with the masses needs explanation. It ispossible to understand that Napoleon had power and so events occurred;with some effort one may even conceive that Napoleon together withother influences was the cause of an event; but how a book, Le Contratsocial, had the effect of making Frenchmen begin to drown oneanother cannot be understood without an explanation of the causalnexus of this new force with the event.

　　Undoubtedly some relation exists between all who livecontemporaneously, and so it is possible to find some connectionbetween the intellectual activity of men and their historicalmovements, just as such a connection may be found between themovements of humanity and commerce, handicraft, gardening, or anythingelse you please. But why intellectual activity is considered by thehistorians of culture to be the cause or expression of the wholehistorical movement is hard to understand. Only the followingconsiderations can have led the historians to such a conclusion: (1)that history is written by learned men, and so it is natural andagreeable for them to think that the activity of their classsupplies the basis of the movement of all humanity, just as asimilar belief is natural and agreeable to traders, agriculturists,and soldiers (if they do not express it, that is merely becausetraders and soldiers do not write history), and (2) that spiritualactivity, enlightenment, civilization, culture, ideas, are allindistinct, indefinite conceptions under whose banner it is veryeasy to use words having a still less definite meaning, and whichcan therefore be readily introduced into any theory.

　　But not to speak of the intrinsic quality of histories of thiskind (which may possibly even be of use to someone for something)the histories of culture, to which all general histories tend more andmore to approximate, are significant from the fact that afterseriously and minutely examining various religious, philosophic, andpolitical doctrines as causes of events, as soon as they have todescribe an actual historic event such as the campaign of 1812 forinstance, they involuntarily describe it as resulting from an exerciseof power- and say plainly that that was the result of Napoleon's will.Speaking so, the historians of culture involuntarily contradictthemselves, and show that the new force they have devised does notaccount for what happens in history, and that history can only beexplained by introducing a power which they apparently do notrecognize.