Second Epilogue: 1813-20 - Chapter V

by Leo Tolstoy

　　The life of the nations is not contained in the lives of a fewmen, for the connection between those men and the nations has not beenfound. The theory that this connection is based on the transference ofthe collective will of a people to certain historical personages is anhypothesis unconfirmed by the experience of history.

　　The theory of the transference of the collective will of thepeople to historic persons may perhaps explain much in the domain ofjurisprudence and be essential for its purposes, but in itsapplication to history, as soon as revolutions, conquests, or civilwars occur- that is, as soon as history begins- that theory explainsnothing.

　　The theory seems irrefutable just because the act of transference ofthe people's will cannot be verified, for it never occurred.

　　Whatever happens and whoever may stand at the head of affairs, thetheory can always say that such and such a person took the leadbecause the collective will was transferred to him.

　　The replies this theory gives to historical questions are like thereplies of a man who, watching the movements of a herd of cattle andpaying no attention to the varying quality of the pasturage indifferent parts of the field, or to the driving of the herdsman,should attribute the direction the herd takes to what animal happensto be at its head.

　　"The herd goes in that direction because the animal in front leadsit and the collective will of all the other animals is vested inthat leader." This is what historians of the first class say- thosewho assume the unconditional transference of the people's will.

　　"If the animals leading the herd change, this happens because thecollective will of all the animals is transferred from one leader toanother, according to whether the animal is or is not leading themin the direction selected by the whole herd." Such is the replyhistorians who assume that the collective will of the people isdelegated to rulers under conditions which they regard as known. (Withthis method of observation it often happens that the observer,influenced by the direction he himself prefers, regards those asleaders who, owing to the people's change of direction, are nolonger in front, but on one side, or even in the rear.)

　　"If the animals in front are continually changing and thedirection of the whole herd is constantly altered, this is becausein order to follow a given direction the animals transfer their willto the animals that have attracted our attention, and to study themovements of the herd we must watch the movements of all the prominentanimals moving on all sides of the herd." So say the third class ofhistorians who regard all historical persons, from monarchs tojournalists, as the expression of their age.

　　The theory of the transference of the will of the people to historicpersons is merely a paraphrase- a restatement of the question in otherwords.

　　What causes historical events? Power. What is power? Power is thecollective will of the people transferred to one person. Under whatcondition is the will of the people delegated to one person? Oncondition that that person expresses the will of the whole people.That is, power is power: in other words, power is a word the meaningof which we do not understand.

　　If the realm of human knowledge were confined to abstract reasoning,then having subjected to criticism the explanation of "power" thatjuridical science gives us, humanity would conclude that power ismerely a word and has no real existence. But to understand phenomenaman has, besides abstract reasoning, experience by which he verifieshis reflections. And experience tells us that power is not merely aword but an actually existing phenomenon.

　　Not to speak of the fact that no description of the collectiveactivity of men can do without the conception of power, theexistence of power is proved both by history and by observingcontemporary events.

　　Whenever an event occurs a man appears or men appear, by whosewill the event seems to have taken place. Napoleon III issues a decreeand the French go to Mexico. The King of Prussia and Bismarck issuedecrees and an army enters Bohemia. Napoleon I issues a decree andan army enters Russia. Alexander I gives a command and the Frenchsubmit to the Bourbons. Experience shows us that whatever event occursit is always related to the will of one or of several men who havedecreed it.

　　The historians, in accord with the old habit of acknowledging divineintervention in human affairs, want to see the cause of events inthe expression of the will of someone endowed with power, but thatsupposition is not confirmed either by reason or by experience.

　　On the one side reflection shows that the expression of a man'swill- his words- are only part of the general activity expressed in anevent, as for instance in a war or a revolution, and so withoutassuming an incomprehensible, supernatural force- a miracle- onecannot admit that words can be the immediate cause of the movements ofmillions of men. On the other hand, even if we admitted that wordscould be the cause of events, history shows that the expression of thewill of historical personages does not in most cases produce anyeffect, that is to say, their commands are often not executed, andsometimes the very opposite of what they order occurs.

　　Without admitting divine intervention in the affairs of humanitywe cannot regard "power" as the cause of events.

　　Power, from the standpoint of experience, is merely the relationthat exists between the expression of someone's will and the executionof that will by others.

　　To explain the conditions of that relationship we must firstestablish a conception of the expression of will, referring it toman and not to the Deity.

　　If the Deity issues a command, expresses His will, as ancienthistory tells us, the expression of that will is independent of timeand is not caused by anything, for the Divinity is not controlled byan event. But speaking of commands that are the expression of the willof men acting in time and in relation to one another, to explain theconnection of commands with events we must restore: (1) thecondition of all that takes place: the continuity of movement intime both of the events and of the person who commands, and (2) theinevitability of the connection between the person commanding andthose who execute his command.